THE PRESERVE OF THINKERS

In a common mediæval outlook, what we now see as the subject matter of natural science was conceived as filled with meaning, as if all of nature were a book of lessons for us; and it is a mark of intellectual progress that educated people cannot now take that idea seriously, except perhaps in some symbolic role. (John McDowell, *Mind and World* (1994: 71)

It is as though we had imagined that the essential thing about a living person was his outer form, and so produced a block of wood in this form; and were abashed to see the dead block, which had no similarity to the living being at all. (Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* §430)

Have we made the progress McDowell speaks of? Science has, no doubt. In philosophy, though, that mediæval idea may masquerade as science itself. Masquerade only: *nothing*, so not science, suggests messages in nature of the sort found in books. So I will argue. Nature *is* full of messages for us. That red sky at night tells a sailor something. But it is superstition to approach such messages as one would a text or utterance or speech act—though superstition which still tempts some.[1]

What distinguishes the messages in texts or speech acts? First, they are *issued,* produced, conveyed, by some author. (They are also *borne* by, or contained in, the text or act itself.) Representing *can* just be holding a stance or posture towards things, a condition one is in. Representing something to be so, e.g., (henceforth representing-to-be) can just be *taking* it to be so. I will call such representing *autorepresenting*. Such will be a side issue here. By contrast, the authoring of a message is an episode, a happening. (We can, of course, think of a book's *bearing* of an authored message as a condition it is in.)

Second, the episode in question is one of *producing* something. An author of the sorts of messages found in texts and speech acts, in issuing a message, assumes responsibility; liability to praise or blame for achieving, or not, those successes or failures at which the message is to be taken to be aimed. Where a book contains *messages*, there is a door at which blame is to be lain.

Third, the kind of representing involved in texts and speech acts is representing-as: it is (*inter alia*) representing things *as being* some way there *is* for things to be. Not all representing-as is representing-to-be. Correspondingly, not all the representing found in books is representing-to-be. But all representing-to-be is representing-as. Pia may represent Sid as a ballerina by sketching him in tutu and third position, without suggesting that he is one. Conversely, to express the wish that he stop snoring, she must represent things as being such that Sid continues snoring, and assign that the status of what is wished-not. Representing-to-be can thus be parsed as representing things *as* being a certain way, in assigning that way a certain status: a way things are. (I do not claim that speech acts have unique parsings). So representing-as is a general case of which representing-to-be is a genre. What had the capacity to represent-to-be, thus what had the capacity to represent truly or falsely, would *ipso facto*, more generally, have the capacity to represent-as.

Fourth, *issuing* a message, so, in a different sense, bearing one, is *making* it (suitably) available, manifest. So for representing of the kind at stake here, the kind books go in for, to be is to be suitably recognisable. Making something recognisable requires suitable means for doing so. Among the means at work in any given case of the representing I am after here is what I will call a *vehicle*. A vehicle is, first, something which is recognisable as what it is—so as occurring, present, or not—independent of whether any representing is going on, or of what messages, if any, it bears. Second, it is such that its production, in the circumstances in which it serves as vehicle, makes recognisable just that recognising-as done by its author (producer) in producing it. It might, e.g., be some English words, or some graphic form they have. If an author may be said to have represented things as being thus and so, or to have assigned that way for things to be a certain status, then his vehicle may be said (on a different reading of the verbs 'represent' and 'assign' to do so too. Pia said that Sid snores, her words *say* that he does.

With an eye to the contrast with autorepresenting, I will use verb term 'allorepresent' (and its derivatives) for representing which is authored by an author who (which) thus incurs responsibility for its successes and failures, which is representing-as, and which as such that for it to be is for it to be suitably recognisable. I mean this to be read so that both the author and his (its) vehicle can be said to allorepresent, each on his/its proper reading of the verb. My theses are then: only allorepresenting (or autorepresenting) can be representing-as—*a fortiori* can be representing-to-be, so can be representing truly or falsely; only a thinker (or his vehicles) can allorepresent. There is an idea about, I think, that while an author may need a vehicle, a vehicle—what works to make some representing-as recognisable—does not *always* need an author. This is one idea I hope to help out of the world.

Allorepresenting contrasts with what I will call *effect-representing*—a relation between one historical circumstance and another. Here one bit of history is what is represented. Another does the representing. That teetering rock represents æons of wind erosion. Pia's haggard mien represents years of Sid's grunting. Generalisations obtain. Teetering rocks may always represent wind erosion (except where they do not). Effect-representing is far from reserved for thinkers. Whatever happens does it. All it takes is an ætiology. Its role here is as what allorepresenting had better not turn out to be.

Allorepresenting is choosier than effect-representing. Those empty seats in the house may represent (the workings of) poor casting, a hostile press, Sid's paunch (he playing the lead), and so on *ad inf*. No need to choose; *a fortiori* no need for the seats to choose. Where there is a case of allorepresenting, there is such a thing as *the* way things were thus represented as being. *Something* must choose what way this is to be. I mention this now, for elaboration later, because it is a point that will matter *very* much.

This essay effect-represents the posing of a question, 'Does perceptual experience have content?' It places that question in a wider context. If having content is indulging in representing-as, and if my thesis holds, then the answer is no. This is not to say that someone who enjoys perceptual experience does not, perhaps inevitably, in doing so thereby autorepresent.

1. Thinkers: The notion of a thinker at work here is Descartes'. Aiming to distinguish *res cogitans* from dumb brutes and refined machines, he offers two marks,

of which the first is that they [machines, brutes] could never use words or other signs, composing them as we do to express their thoughts to others. For one could indeed conceive of a machine being so arranged that it offered words, and even that it offered certain ones about material actions causing certain changes in its organs … but not of it arranging them diversely so as to respond to the sense of all that was said in its presence in the way that even the most mentally deficient men can. … And the second is that, while they did several things as well as, or perhaps better than, any of us, they would infallibly fall short in others, by which one would discover that they did not act through knowledge, but solely by the disposition of their organs. (1637: 92)

"Reason" Hilary Putnam wrote, "can transcend whatever it can survey." (Putnam 1988: 119) Such is Descartes' idea. Take any implementable theory of how to do such-and-such—a theory with definite predictions as to the thing to do when faced with such a task. A Cartesian thinker is always prepared to recognise ways of performing the task other than those the theory dictates; moreover, to recognise whether such a new way, and not the theory's, would be the thing to do—and whether the task itself is a thing to do. We, but not swallows, can recognise when old ways of building mud nests, or times for building them, are not best. Our sensitivity to the world's bearing on the thing for us to do is, unlike theirs, unbounded in this sense.

Suppose the task is recognition—e.g.,telling pigs at sight. Pigs are recognisable by how they look. No one thinks, though, that to be a pig just *is* to have that look. Porcine (or ovine) cosmetic surgery is, so far, pointless but hardly inconceivable. Though most of us could not *say* just what it is that makes a pig, for any putative porcine feature, we are sensitive to what would bear on whether what lacked it might, for all that, be a pig (or what had it might not be). Here our capacities transcend whatever reason can survey, as per Putnam's idea.

Keeping up one's end in a conversation is (an often taxing) project. Descartes' first mark of a thinker is, thus, a special case of his second. Pia says, 'My Porsche is in the shop.' For Sid to respond to this—with what intelligibly *is* a response—would be for him to say what bears, in some understandable way, and some way he could understandably aim for it to bear, on the Porsche being in the shop (or on Pia's having said so). He might say, e.g., 'I hope you like Opels', or 'I'll warn our *taxista*', or 'German over-engineering!', or 'I'd better rent some films', or 'Have you been paid this month yet?', depending on the way this would be understood to link to what Pia said and the links he aims to forge. Renting films may or may not be the thing to do when Porsche-less. Any of indefinitely many things might make it so—because one just *would* not go out without the Porsche, because the films will cover the sound of Pia's weeping, because if you give the mechanics films to watch, perhaps they will actually fix the Porsche, etc. Moreover, the connection between the Porsche being in the shop and Pia being Porsche-less for the weekend is itself contingent. 'I'd better rent films' might, or might not, be *continuing* the conversation, depending on whether *some* such connection between films and Porschelessness is one there might, in the circumstances, intelligibly be, and one Sid might be understood to be making. Sid need not aim to *continue* the conversation. But for him to be an intelligible conversation partner—*equipped* for conversing—he must be sensitive to how the world might work in forging such links, and to their existence or not; to how it might thus

bear on the response for him to make. Descartes' point: such sensitivity, for a Cartesian thinker, transcends, in Putnam's sense, whatever reason can survey.

Not all allorepresenting continues a conversation. A weather bulletin does not. Pia telling Sid that the Porsche was in the shop *started* one. So, one might think, not all allorepresenting requires sensitivity to those same factors on which the cogency of a response depends. But for a Cartesian thinker, at least, allorepresenting is always a project, guided by sensitivity to the world's bearing on the thing to do in realising it—*inter alia*, on *how* to represent things—so to those same considerations which filter *responses* from mere chatter. What Sid says to Pia depends not just on what, as he sees things, a reply might be, but also on what further ends he aims for his allorepresenting to serve—being sympathetic, making light of things, evincing disinterest, suggesting how Pia can make it through the weekend. That Cartesian, theory-transcendent, thinking which guides his perceptions as to what a response would be (and *what* response) works here, too, in his seeing what to do to reach his aims, and, in such matters, what his aims should be. It is thus at work whether it is a question of continuing a conversation or not. *Our* allorepresenting draws, *per se*, on those capacities which mark a Cartesian thinker off from an unthinker.

So far, allorepresenting draws on resources reserved for a Cartesian thinker only insofar as it is in the service of further ends, such as conversing. It has not yet been shown that all allorepresenting must aim so to serve; nor, more importantly, that such resources are drawn on anyway in fixing just *how* things are thus represented being. A first step in this direction is to note that allorepresenting is creative. In saying of a Mondriaan, 'That's Dutch', Sid created a new way for things to be. There was already, thanks to the painting's creation, such a thing as it being Dutch; now, thanks to Sid's performance, there is also such a thing as things being as he thus represented them. Had Mondriaan not so painted, there would not have been that first way; had Sid not so performed, there would not have been that second. The vehicle Sid might have represented otherwise if *used* otherwise. Something in *his* use of it must identify when things would be as *he* thus represented them.

Talk of creativity here *may* seem mere word play. Sid (somehow) *selected* a certain (already existing) way for things to be—for that painting to be Dutch. He represented things as being *that* way. There is, to be sure, the question how he effected *that* selection. An answer might be interesting. But given this much, when (in what cases) things would be as he represented them is decided by when that painting would be Dutch. There is no more to Sid's created way than this. So one might think. But perhaps not. Signs of more emerge when we ask what it *would* be for a painting to be Dutch. Mondriaan, born in Amersfoort, with Dutch roots dating from before the 17th century, moved to Paris and spent much of his working life there. Suppose that he took French citizenship, joined a French collective, and produced the painting, in their signature style, as (an anonymous) part of their grand entrance into art history. Is the painting, then, perhaps, French? Or, conversely, suppose that Mondriaan, born of French expatriates in Amersfoort, had worked there all his life. Is his painting then French or Dutch? Might its style matter to this? Again, were the van Eyck brothers (of South Netherlands) Dutch? Such questions have no flat answers. With the van Eycks, for example, it depends on what you count as being Dutch, or *where* you so count things. But there *may* be unequivocal answers to some parallel questions as to whether things are as Sid represented them in representing the painting as being Dutch. If Mondriaan had come from, and worked in, Ghent, for example, it might (depending on the circumstances of Sid's allorepresenting) be clear that things were then *not* as he had represented them. Given such possibilities, *creating* a

way for things to be—as one represented them in some episode of representing—might plausibly draw on such capacities peculiar to a Cartesian thinker as the ability to tailor one's representing to the purposes it is to serve.

The ability to converse contains in it a certain *freedom* in language use, to which Noam Chomsky points:

> A typical example of stimulus control for Skinner would be the response to a piece of music with the utterance Mozart or to a painting with the response Dutch. ... Suppose instead of saying Dutch we had said Clashes with the wallpaper, I thought you liked abstract work, Never saw it before, Tilted, Hanging too low, Beautiful, Hideous, Remember our camping trip last summer?, or whatever else might come into our minds when looking at a picture ... (Language, 35, No. 1 (1959), 26-58, 52)

What Pia says as Vic shows her his new Mondriaan might be any of indefinitely many things. Her ability to allorepresent is one to respond to such provocations, or any specifiable one, in any of indefinitely many ways. As I hope to make clear, it would be misunderstanding what freedom is involved here if one took it for anything other than the operation of Cartesian thinking—if, e.g., one thought of it as merely the ability to produce what was to be one's representing in the absence of what it was to represent.

Descartes' conception of a thinker is not the only one. A simpler one would be: a thinker is whoever, or whatever, thinks things so. Cats and dogs *might* do this, depending on what it is to think something so. I take no stands here. *If* cats and dogs are thinkers in this sense, perhaps for all that they fail Descartes' tests. We would then have a weaker notion. It would remain to decide whether such weaker thinkers might, not just autorepresent, but also allorepresent, or *emit* representing-as. But where unthinking representing-as has so far been suggested, it is not the work of such weaker thinkers. I thus leave this issue aside.

2. Generality: Effect-representing is a two-place relation, representing-as a three place one. In effect-representing, one historical circumstance represents another. The presence of those empty seats represents poor casting. (One *type* of circumstance might, as a rule, or invariably, represent another.) By contrast, in representing-as, something, A, represents something else, B, *as* something, C.

What fills the A-place in allorepresenting is either its author, or his (its) vehicle—not circumstances, but that whose being thus and so might be a circumstance. Where allorepresenting is liable to success or failure (as in representing-to-be), it is the author at whose door blame, where fitting is to be lain. *He* (it) bears the responsibility. Some suggest that authorless vehicles might *bear* messages, so represent-as. It would be obscure where then to lay such blame. It matters, correspondingly, how much it matters that there should be such a place.

What might fill the B-place? In one case (here the core case) it is *things* which may be represented as being thus and so. Here 'things' bears its catholic reading, making no room for the question 'Which?'. A *case* of things being thus and so is always things being as they are.

Other things may sometimes also fit this bill. In (here) a derivative case, some *thing* might be represented as being thus and so. Sid, e.g., might be represented as being such as to snore. Something's being as it is is what might be a case of something being thus and so.

What matters most here is what occupies the C-place: that *as* which something is represented being. What fits in this place is a way for things (or for a thing) to be. For Sid to snore, or things *so* being, is a way for things to be, so a way to allorepresent things being, e.g., in *saying* so, or asking whether.

Frege identifies a generality inherent in any thought:

> A thought always contains something which reaches beyond the particular case, by means of which it presents this to consciousness as falling under some given generality. (1882a: *Kernsatz* 4)

The generality at issue here is not one which distinguishes some thoughts from others, but one belonging to all thoughts. A thought is, e.g, that Sid snores. It is thus *of* things being such that Sid snores. It *presents* things so being; and with 'that' attached, their so being *as* enjoying a certain status: as part of how things are. Representing-to-be takes a further step: not merely presenting a given way *as being* a way things are—what would be just more representing-as— but as assuming, or incurring, liability to a particular sort of success or failure, getting it right or wrong. No thought takes this extra step. It cannot *aim* at such success or failure (or anything). The *thought* that pigs swim is not to blame if they do not.

Whence this generality? Following Frege, a thought is what brings truth into question at all, done only by fixing (or being) a particular question of it; a particular point on which *thinkers* might agree or not. One cannot simply aim at truth *tout court*. It must be truth *in re* something. Which is to say: one cannot aim at *everything*. So a question of truth cannot turn on everything. Whether that Mondriaan is Dutch may turn on Mondriaan's parentage, but not on whether Pia was at Hédiard yesterday, or Sid is wearing sandals. It follows that a range of cases—an indefinitely large one—are ones which would, or might, count as things being such that that painting is Dutch—ones with Sid in socks and sandals, ones with him *pied nu*, and so on ad inf. A thought (and that way for things to be which it is of), reaches in its own way to particular cases, thus reaching just what it does. *How* it reaches is contained in it being the thought it is. Thus a thought's inherent generality and that of a way for things to be.

Frege puts two pieces in play. Thoughts, so ways for things to be, are one piece. The other is what he calls 'the particular case'—what a thought presents as falling under some generality. What falls *under* a generality is intrinsically one-off: nothing *else* could be things being as they now are. What makes the particular particular, though, is rather its lack of reach. Nothing in *its* being the case it is identifies *any* question of truth, or what matters to it. The sun is setting slowly over the Douro's mouth. For the sun to be setting slowly is a way for things to be. Things being as they now are is a case of this. Study *that* case as closely as you like, and you will not learn from *it* what matters, and how, to whether *a* particular case would be a case of this or not. For this one must look at just *what* generality is to be instanced. Generalising, no proper part of a generality's reach determines what further reach it might or might not have. Generalities and particular cases are thus two fundamentally different sorts of things. I will

speak of the first, ways for things to be, as *conceptual*, the last, things being as they are, as *nonconceptual*. That core relation between these two domains, being a case of, I will call *instancing*, its converse *reaching to*.

One can *witness*, e.g., watch, things being as they are. One does this, e.g., in seeing the sun, setting over the Douro's mouth. What is *visible*—the sun, e.g.,—has location. What has location is what *may* interact causally with its surroundings. Such is part of Frege's point in insisting that thoughts cannot be objects of sensory awareness. They are the wrong sorts of things for that. They are equally unfit for causal interaction. It cannot be the causal profile of a way for things to be which makes it occupy the third place in the relation *allorepresenting* for given first and second terms. It *has* no such profile. Allorepresenting cannot be made of effect-representing by any such route.

In (1892-1895) Frege wrote,

> The fundamental logical relation is that of an object falling under a concept: all relations between concepts can be reduced to this. (1892-1895: 128)

Is there a parallel here in that relation, instancing, between the nonconceptual and the conceptual? A given item within the conceptual participates in the instancing relation in a given way. It pairs up in this, in a given way, with the particular cases the world provides (or allows for). *What* determines its participation? Not logic. Logic concerns relations *within* the conceptual; not those between the conceptual and something else. Nor do relations *within* the conceptual, determine this; or at least not without enough facts already given as to enough other terms of those relations reach themselves. What makes *things being such that Sid snores* reach as it does cannot be some law which dictates when to count a particular case as instancing that generality, unless it is already given what particular cases that law reaches. Nor can it be relations *within* the conceptual which fix how the conceptual as a whole relates to the nonconceptual. A question, 'How, by what, does the conceptual reach to the nonconceptual *überhaupt*?' can only be misbegotten. For a way for things to be to be the one it is is (*inter alia*, perhaps) for it to reach as it does. There is no identifying it as what it is while leaving it open for something *else* to settle where *it* reaches. There is, accordingly no problem of how something else *could* make it reach as it does. So, too, there is no grasping *what* way for things to be a given way is without grasping well enough when something would be a case of it.

Not, though, as though there cannot be *reasons* for and/or against counting a particular case as a case of such-and-such. Quite the contrary. A way for things to be, as Frege argued, is *per se* a way for our shared environment to be. Its instancing (if it were instanced) by things being as they are would thus bear in a particular way on how things would be otherwise. Its instancing would stand at particular places in webs of factive meaning. There is, then, the question how its instancing *would* matter if things being as they are did count as this, and, correspondingly, of how its instancing *ought* to matter, to how things were otherwise. Would it be *right* to count what mattered as its instancing would if *this* so counted as *instancing* this way for things to be? A chrome yellow Porsche would normally look yellow in daylight. Pia's Porsche, though painted chrome yellow, would not so look, e.g., because it is covered with baked-on beige mud. Is its being as it is a case of a Porsche being yellow? What would follow if

we said yes, what if we said no? Is the way its being yellow *would* then bear on things consistent with what it is or might be for a Porsche to be yellow? Such is a topic for rational discussion, in which one who grasped what it was for a Porsche to be yellow would be equipped to engage. To count her Porsche as yellow would be to take one view as to how a yellow Porsche ought to, or might, look in daylight. To refuse so to count it would be to take a competing view. To grasp what (a Porsche) being yellow is is to be positioned to way such alternatives properly.

Here Putnam's words apply again: reason transcends whatever it can survey. How *ought* one to expect a Porsche to look if it is yellow? If Pia's Porsche, while painted yellow, does not now look yellow in normal daylight, one cannot expect a theory which generated in advance all the reasons there might be (or might have been) for this. Nor, correlatively, could one expect to say in advance what it would mean (factively) for the Porsche to be yellow if its failure here did, and, again, if it did not, cancel its claim to count as being yellow—as instancing the generality *being a yellow Porsche*. So nor could there (plausibly) be a theory which predicted in advance, when it would be true to what a Porsche's being yellow is, where there was such a failure, to rule in the one way or the other. Which, if right, is to say: there can be no specifiable prosthetic for *our* sense of when to say (when it would be true to say), when not, that a Porsche is yellow. Which is to say: the ability to see this draws essentially on those capacities which mark a Cartesian thinker. Thus, too, for the ability to see when things would be as Sid represented them in representing Pia's Porsche as yellow, so the ability to grasp *what* way his created way—things being as he represented them—is.

An ability to see what would, or might, *count* as a case of something being yellow is very different from a mere ability to detect what are in fact cases of what does so count, as an ability to see what would count as something being a pig differs from an ability to tell a pig at sight. An ability to tell a pig at sight *is* that thanks to the fact that pigs are recognisable by certain visual features—by how they look. But we all recognise that to be a pig is not, certainly not just, to have those features. Not all that grunts is, or need be, porcine; not all that is porcine need grunt. So an ability to tell pigs at sight *is* that only in an hospitable environment. Flood the environment with enough ringers, and it ceases to be an ability at all. An ability to see what would *count* as something being a pig transcends such limits. It is, *inter alia*, an ability to see when we have ringers to deal with. *Such* an ability is what is drawn on in identifying what way Sid represented things being in representing Pia's Porsche as yellow. It is for such abilities, I have suggested, that there is no prosthetic.

An author of allorepresenting is responsible for his creations. Blame for success or failure—e.g., for representing things as they are not, or as they ought not to have been—is to be lain at his door. But he can be *blamed* only for what is in his control, for what he/it is sensitive to having done or not. He could, might, have done otherwise; he is *thus* blameworthy for not *having* so done. The point just made is, in brief, only a Cartesian thinker could be thus responsible for having represented things in one way rather than another.

To some this will seem wrong. To their eyes, nature, or some of its creations, though no thinker in any sense, can assume the sort of responsibility for some of its (or their) productions that one does *per se* in allorepresenting; notably the sort of responsibility one does in representing truly or falsely—in making oneself liable for being right or wrong as to how things are. The rough idea is: those creations exist to fulfil a purpose; they assume the responsibility something would in fulfilling that purpose. What follows, I hope, will demolish

that idea.

3. Selecting: Allorepresenting must accomplish a certain task. Something in its doing must select, or identify, some one way for things to be as the way things were thus represented being. I will call this *the selection task.*

To achieve selection one must trace a path through a cloud. Suppose we think of a space of ways for things to be. A point in that space is, say, things being such that Pia's Porsche is yellow. Now think of a space of particular cases. Take a proper part of it. Restrict it, say, to all the cases there have been so far. Then that point in the space of ways traces a class of paths through this space (if you like, fixes a subspace). It traces those paths which connect all the particular cases to which it reaches. *Inter alia*, it traces paths through that proper part, all the cases so far. Now take any particular case not in that proper part—say, things being as they will tomorrow. Three classes of ways for things to be trace that same class of paths through the proper part as our initial way does, but differ in what they do when it comes to this novel case. One class are instanced by it. Another are not. A third do not settle whether they are instanced by it or not. In what class is our initial way? The same question arises for any way for things to be which allorepresenting creates, e.g., for being as Sid represented things. Where the selection task is accomplished such questions have answers.

What gives them answers in our own case? I now mention, briefly, two sources of material. First, we are retrospectively sensitive to what we do. We have, as one might put it, the capacity to be abashed. Sid can recognise that, as it turned out, things were as he represented them, would not have been had the Porsche been in the garage when it burned, but are all the same even though it is now mud-covered. Answers to the question how he represented things *could* appeal to what he is thus prepared to recognise. There is at least that source of material.

Retrospectively we stand detached from what we have done—not catching ourselves in the act, but now seeing ourselves as other might. The capacity for such detached stances is also exploited in other ways. We, or some of us, may collectively identify some way for things to be independent of it being a way things were represented on any given occasion. There is such a thing as calling Pia's Porsche yellow. We can then ask what we are prepared to recognise anyway, independent of any episode of presenting something as falling under that generality, what we would, or might, count, what not, as a case of things being that way—what *we* would be prepared to call Pia's Porsche being yellow. How much chrome could you add, e.g.? We are *jointly* sensitive to such things. We can agree or dispute about them. Room is thereby made for the objectivity of judgement; room for a given case's being one one of a Porsche being yellow to be among the ways things *are*. It is unclear how *else* such room might be made.

For Cartesian thinkers allorepresenting is a project, part of, and aimed at serving, further ones. Such is a second source of material which could effect selection. A Cartesian thinker guides his projects by his perceptions of how the world bears on what the thing to do would be—on which projects to execute, and how. His perceptions reflect an unbounded sensitivity to ways the world does, and might, bear on this. So it is, in particular, with his perceptions of *what* to allorepresent, and how. *We* represent with an agenda. Such agenda may include contributing to, or furthering, further projects in particular ways—e.g., saying that whose being so would bear in particular ways on how those further projects *are* to be executed. If such is *on* the agenda, and if the representer succeeds in representing things

accordingly, he *will* make the contribution. Conversely, if such is (recognisably) on the agenda, and if he *can* be understood as having represented things accordingly—saying what, if so, would have that bearing—then such is reason so to understand him. In what it would be so to understand him there is material which *could*, *if* applied to identifying a way for him to have represented things, effect selection.

I will elaborate this idea later. For the moment I merely illustrate. Guests are coming. As Pia opens the wines to breathe, Sid sets the table. He has forks and spoons in hand, but seems unable to find knives. Noticing this, Pia says, 'There are knives in the third drawer.' Indeed there are. Suppose, though, that the third drawer had contained Pia's art supplies. These include a fair collection of matte knives (roughly, handles mounting razor blades). One *can* understand there being knives in a drawer so that the presence of matte knives counts as things so being. But one might sometimes understand such talk such that such presence, on its own, would not count as things being as thus represented. When I tell you where the knives are, matte knives *need* not count as specimens of what I mean. The *words* Pia used might be understood in either way. But *she* was to be understood as speaking in aid of what Sid is doing—contributing in the way just scouted to his project's execution. Understand *her* in the first way and there is no such bearing. Understand her in the second and there is. Such contributes at least to tracing a path through the cloud of ways for things to be which contains all those which are there being knives in that drawer on *some* understanding of there so being. Whether this *does*, in fact, achieve selection for things being as Pia represented them may remain an open question for the moment.

4. Agreement: We guide our allorepresenting by what *could* achieve selection. But, to borrow Freud's term, we are not always masters in our own house. When, and how, not?

Frege distinguished the psychology of holding true from the logic of *being* true. Similarly one can distinguish the psychology of holding forth as true from the logic of being as represented. In Adelaide, Sid comes in from the backyard and announces, 'The lamb is on the barbie.' Little Tara screams, 'Oh, no!', and runs into the backyard, where she finds her doll safe and sound on the table, while smoke rises from the grill. There is something Tara understood Sid to say. That is a psychological fact. There is something Sid meant to say. That is another. There is then the question what Sid did say, how he is, in fact, *to be* understood. That 'to be', like the 'to' in 'the thing to do', removes us from the psychological. Our concern now is with the logic of being as represented. Such a non-psychological question need not have a determinate answer: there was an amusing misunderstanding, and there's an end on it. But it may. Perhaps Sid said what he meant to, and Tara misunderstood. Or perhaps the other way around.

What answers such a non-psychological question? What makes an answer *right*? A starting point: for there to be allorepresenting is for it to be (made) recognisable. How are we to understand this 'recognisable'? Sid's representing might not be recognisable to a monolingual Latvian, nor to a Martian, or a cat. Such hardly matters. His analyst might recognise what he intended. She might recognise this of still more bizarre performances. Such again does not bear on how he ought to be—is to be—understood to have represented things. There are, though, those who *ought* to be able to understand him; those competent enough, and appreciative enough of his circumstances to do so. There may then be what they would have a *right* to expect if then so addressed; how a competent understander who knew what he

should have of the circumstances would reasonably have taken Sid to be representing things. So, the idea is, *did* Sid represent things being.

Who are these people? In the example, most Australians, one would suppose, and some of the rest of us (most of us, if initiates in Aussie practice and patois). But what matters is this. You and I (and most Australians, etc.) share a sense of what to say in cases like Sid and Tara's. It is a sense which indefinitely many other thinkers—perhaps not all—either share, or could be brought to share through sufficient familiarity with our ways of allorepresenting. Given the *psychological* facts—the actual facts of our agreement in such matters—there is such a thing as what a competent, appreciative audience for Sid's words *would* be; such a way for a thing, or group, to be as *being such an audience. That* there is is something we can recognise. Given what it would be to be this, we can also recognise this to be a way for a thing to be which *is* instanced. There are, further, recognisable facts as to how one who was this way would understand Sid, and his representing, were he so addressed. Such (non-psychological) facts would of course be recognisable to one who was the way in question. They are recognisable to us because we are that way.

For *any* allorepresenting there is its audience—the sort of thing equipped and placed to recognise it for what it is. To belong to Sid's audience is to instance the just-mentioned way for a thing to be. In other cases, it would be to instance being competent and appreciative *in re* the representing there occurring. In any case, the audience is, in principle, indefinitely extendible. Sid, as any Cartesian thinker, shares with his audience those retrospective abilities I called a capacity to be abashed. Such can be directed in concert at what Sid has done. *Just* this is what allows for effecting the selection task for his allorepresenting. So it is with a *thinker's* allorepresenting. It should be stressed that *this* way of failing to be master in one's own house, so of relying on others for effecting a selection task, is reserved for Cartesian thinkers. It works where a way the representer ought reasonably to be taken is as doing what a Cartesian thinker *might* be doing (in the circumstances). If the representer is not a Cartesian thinker, then, while mistaking it for one might be *understandable*, he cannot have been to be taken as so performing.

Where allorepresenting *has* an audience (present sense), where there is such a thing as what it would be to belong to it, to belong to the audience is to have sufficient insight into how the representing *is* to be understood, and to have such insight is to belong to it. When it comes to cases the audience is the measure of what insight is here. That there *is* an audience may be manifest in its (extendible) agreement. The audience's role needs stressing. Following Frege we may take it as intrinsic to any given way for things to be to reach just as it does. So fix a way and nothing extrinsic to it, so no audience can make *it* reach in one way rather than another. But what way a given way for things to be is is *one* question. What way is such that Sid represented things as that way is another, as is what way *one* speaks of where he speaks of lamb being on the barbie. If an audience provides no answer to the first sort of question, it *does* provide the answer to the second. For a way for things to be to be the way Sid represented things being (in speaking of his barbie) is for it to reach to particular cases just as his audience (in the above sense) would be prepared to recognise his representing (what he did) as reaching.

Any allorepresenting needs its audience, whether thinkers or not. For a Cartesian thinker's representing, the audience is of a certain sort. It *shares* a capacity: one, as I put it, to be abashed. This capacity can be directed collectively at any instance of relevant representing.

It issues in acknowledgement of particular cases as thus reached or not (not determined). Just here, in what a thinking audience *would* expect, the crucial step is taken from the psychological to the nonpsychological—here from holding forth to being true. What the audience would do. where it is *this* audience, is no longer a psychological generalisation, nor a prediction. It is not like a statement about what Sid, or Tara, or the average Australian would do. It is about how *anyone* would respond to Sid if getting things *right*.

Our shared sensitivity to the conceptual performs this step for us. We achieve selection tasks in ways which are the reasonable ones for the sort of representing *we* engage in. *Our* sensitivity to the conceptual, such as it is, cannot be enlisted to perform this step for an unthinker. If there are (parallels to) psychological generalisations to be made about the unthinker's doings, such need not be refractory to us. If there are patterns in its responsiveness to the environment, we need not be blind to these. But what it *would* thus do does not yet take us from the psychological to the logical, as something must if there is to be allorepresenting. Such a step must be taken by the unthinker on its own, or anyway left on its own by us. And the unthinker's mere sensitivity to the presence of yellow, or pigs, in its surroundings, whatever such may be, gives no right to construe any of its responses as episodes of representing something *as being* yellow, or a pig, rather than as simply detecting yellow's, or porcine, presence. They effect no selection from within the cloud in which that class of paths, cases of something being yellow are but an element. The unthinker's responses in its (presumably) hospitable environment give no right to extrapolate from that subregion of particular cases to the space as a whole. It would be anthropomorhism to construe its responding as it does to pigs as, e.g., its *telling* us, or its peers, that a pig is about. If it were to present particular cases as falling under generalities, the fact that *we* would be inclined to call what it is doing detecting pigs, or yellow, gives no right to take those generalities to be at all like those we can get in mind.

5. Deference: An unthinker could not take the step from the psychological (or how he/it works) to the logical in the way just sketched. The unthinker *could not* be to be recognised as guiding execution of its representing as a Cartesian thinker would or might. Such could not be the right thing to suppose of it. The Cartesian thinker's way of tracing a path through the space of particular cases could not be the unthinker's. But perhaps the unthinker need do no such thing. Perhaps he/it can simply contract the work out, defer the selection task to some other source. One idea along these lines would be: there might be a vehicle, identifiable independent of how it represents things, which *as such* represents things as being some given way; and which, in being the unthinker's vehicle, would make it so that *he/it* so represented things.

Birds build nests but fail Descartes' tests. So, Descartes thought, building nests requires no intelligence. Who would think otherwise? Things *are* otherwise, he thought, when it comes to holding conversations. If not all allorepresenting is holding conversation, perhaps some, like nest building, is achievable achieved by unthinkers. Something else would do the work for the unthinker that thinking does for us. The above is one idea of what that something else might be: vehicles. These, the idea is, would relieve the unthinker of the burden of selecting on its own. Its incapacity would then not matter.

English sentences *might* seem a model for such vehicles. An English sentence as such represents things as being a given way. It speaks as such of that way. The sentence, 'Monkeys

fly', speaks of what it does used or not, whether I take it to do so, speak English, exist, or not. If it speaks of monkeys being flyers, then, where I speak English, it would do so in my mouth. If *it* represents things as being a given way then, the idea is, so do I in speaking it. The idea concludes: where I thus so represent things, for things to be as I represented them is just for monkeys to be flyers. If English sentences so work, then, perhaps, so might other things, among which things which would so work produced by (suitable) unthinkers. That English thus models deference is an idea I hope now to dispose of.

The sentence 'Monkeys fly' *does* say that monkeys fly, speak of them as flyers. But in what aspect of the verb? Shifting aspects may produce illusion. The aspect in which sentences say, or speak, stands out in other verbs. Robin, showing his cousins from Peoria the Batcave, comes to the Batmobile. Pointing at levers and buttons on the dash he says, 'This one ejects the seats. This one fires the grappling hooks. This one autodials the commissioner.' Levers and buttons lack initiative. It will be a long wait before a lever undertakes a project. Or so we hope. Such does not reflect on what Robin said. That lever is *for* ejecting the seats. It is the thing to pull to eject. If it is in working order, you (new aspect of the verb) will then eject.

Such it is for levers to eject. This contrasts with the verb's reading in 'Don't let little Tarquin near the Batmobile. He always ejects the seats.' It is equally a reading of 'fire' and 'autodial' as above. It is one reading, too, of 'say'. It fits the case where we speak of the sentence 'Monkeys fly' as saying that monkeys fly. That sentence (used neat) is *for* saying that monkeys fly, anyway for speaking of their being flyers. If, on an occasion, you wish to say, in speaking English, that monkeys fly, this sentence is, *ceteris paribus*, just the thing for you. Use it in speaking English, in circumstances in which you would say something, and *ceteris paribus*, such as what you will say, or at least speak of.

If Sid says, or said last Tuesday, that monkeys fly, such *may* be reason to think they do. If the sentence, 'Monkeys fly', says that monkeys fly, such cannot be reason so to think. The *sentence*, unlike Sid, is the wrong sort of thing to give such reason. Tarquin always ejects the seats. He ejected them last just as Robin was leaving the Gotham Diner. The sentence cannot have said last Tuesday that monkeys fly, unless this means that it has not, in the interim, changed meaning. To say, where 'say' has that past tense, is to incur liability to success or failure—to getting things right or wrong—of a sort for which a sentence is ineligible.

For an English sentence to *say* something is for it to have a role in the lives of (some) thinkers. It is for it to be a means for *them* to make certain allorepresenting recognisable to their fellows; thus to execute successfully certain of their projects of representing. There is no hint of an idea here that sentences might lift the burden of effecting selection from a being which *could not*, on its own, find its way through, or select from, the space of possibilities, of ways for things to be, as we do in aiming as we do to represent things as some given way, and in recognising what we have done as representing with a certain reach. English *eases* a burden for those who *can* perform it, but does not lift it. Sid said that monkeys fly in saying 'Monkeys fly' only if he aimed, or ought to have been taken to be aiming, at saying *that*; only if 'Monkeys fly' was used, or ought to have been taken to be used, for achieving the success which would thus be aimed at. He would not have said so if, as Frege puts it, the necessary seriousness were missing, e.g., if he *could* not properly be taken so to have aimed.

English has a syntax. It thus generates an indefinitely large set of vehicles, its sentences, from a smaller set of building blocks by fixed rules. What a sentence says, or speak of, is then fixed by what its blocks do, plus the rules which structure them in it. Some ideas for

unthinking representers-as require these to have an indefinitely large set of vehicles they might produce. If perceptual experience represented things as being given ways, for example, it would need to be able to represent things as any of indefinitely many different ones. So the it would need a stock of vehicles built from a smaller set of blocks by some fixed rules. What a vehicle said would thus be fixed by what its blocks contribute to this. Now, it may seem, content may accrue to a vehicle merely by virtue of accruing anyway to its blocks.

But if a building block is to contribute to representing-as, what has accrued to it as such must be no less than representing-as. Representing-as cannot emerge from mere syntactic structuring (unless, somehow, representing-as has already accrued to it). Combine what effect-represents the presence of something puce and what effect-represents the presence of a Porsche however you like, and all you get so far is something which effect-represents the presence of something puce, and the presence of a Porsche. What a given vehicle would require for speaking of some given thing as puce is, *inter alia*, a block which, in context, speaks of a thing as being puce. If the block does that by virtue of the content which has anyway accrued to it as such, then the content which has accrued to it had better be that of speaking of a thing as puce.

In 1882 Frege wrote,

> I do not think that the formation of concepts can precede judgements, because this presupposes an autonomous existence of concepts, but I think concepts arise through the decomposition of a judgeable content. (1882b: 118)

Concepts *arise* through decomposing whole thoughts. A thought is true of *things*, where there is no question 'Which?'. It is true of things, so true, *tout court*. A (non-zero-place) concept is true *of a* thing. Truth-of, Frege notes, can be understood only in terms of *truth*. For the concept (*a thing*) *being puce* to be true, say, of Ed is for it to be true that Ed is puce. A concept (as here spoken of) is a common feature in a range of thoughts—e.g., that Ed is puce, that Pia is puce, that that torus is puce, … . It is *one* way each reaches to particular cases. It fixes a generality under which all such thoughts fall: making truth turn on what is puce. It just *is* a common feature of those thoughts. There is no such feature unless there are such thoughts. Concepts *thus* cannot precede thoughts.

Thus, too, speaking of. There is no speaking of a thing as puce except in the context of saying something as to what is or is not puce, or, more broadly, representing things as some way the being which turns somehow or other on things being or not puce. Speaking of a thing as puce (expressing the concept of being puce) is not something which can precede speaking of *things* (catholic reading) as thus and so. So speaking of a thing as being puce, expressing that concept, is something a building block could do only in the context of its role in the expression of whole thoughts. A building block might do that in isolation only in that aspect of 'speak of' in which to do so is to play a role in the expressing of whole thoughts. Speaking of a certain way for *a* thing to be thus cannot precede the expression of whole thoughts. So the accrual of content to building blocks cannot precede the accrual of content to expressions of them. What could not select a thought for a whole vehicle to express—a way for things to be as how *it* represents things being—could not select a way for *a* thing to be as what some building

block contributes to such representing.

6. Recognition: Where allorepresenting is a project, making recognisable the representing *done* may involve making recognisable *what* project is thereby executed. If it is one of aiding further projects, or serving further ends, *such* may be what needs making recognisable if it is to be made recognisable *how* things are then represented being. Those further aims and ends would then play a role in achieving selection for the representing done. *How* things were represented being could vary according to what those further aims were. Such would make allorepresenting like conversing and unlike building nests. This section expands that idea.

In speech acts words are our allies in achieving recognition. We can exploit their meanings to *help* make recognisable how *we* mean to represent things as being. Such departs from the idea of English as a model for deferred selecting. Words are *aids* in achieving recognition. For them to aid as they do need not be for the way we *do* represent things being, when there is such success, just to be the way they do anyway. Their role as aids need not be to be, on their own, the expression of some given thought. Nor need it be fixed by their meanings alone just what thought would be expressed in using them. Such is an idea exploited to great effect in one way by David Kaplan(1989), and in a different way by Cora Diamond(1991). It has appeared here so far in the idea, e.g., that there need be no *one* way one speaks of things being in speaking of there being knives in the third drawer.

Words which aid recognition need not do so by virtue of their meanings; nor at all. In a restaurant in Abbeville Pia asks for '*ortalans*.' Of *course* one cannot order *ortalans*, or not in *this* establishment, or in this *salle*, or season. But of course, too, this is not what Pia (an anglophone) meant. The way she is eyeing the *oursins* shows her to mean them. Habituated to tourists, the waiter simply brings Pia her *oursins*. Pia managed to make recognisable what way for things to be she was representing as wished for. She managed to request *oursins*. The sentence 'I'd like the *ortalans*' speaks of a different way for things to be. But not every use of it to allorepresent speaks of the way that it does.

In the restaurant, the waiter arrives with their *plateaux de fruits de mer—bulots* for Sid, *oursins* for Pia. But he looks perplexed. Clearly he has forgotten his orders. Seeing this, Sid tells the waiter that Pia ordered the *oursins*. Suppose Pia garbled things, or Sid had done the talking. Are things as Sid thus represented them? If Sid were reporting Pia's progress with speech therapy, or with her pathological shyness (say, to a worried mother), the answer might be 'No'. But here Sid's words are in the service of a further project, placing orders. In contributing to such an enterprise, one is hardly to be held responsible for who did the talking. One *can* understand ordering *oursins* so that who did the talking does not matter. So here, for reasons stated, one *is* so to understand Sid.

To *hold* Sid to have represented things in one way rather than another is to hold him *responsible* for something—here something as to how things are. There is a way things had better be if he is to be let off with discharging responsibilities assumed. For *what* is he reasonably held to account here? Where should his wishes be acceded to, aims honoured, where not? Is he accountable for who did the talking; liable to praise or blame accordingly? Is such reasonably reckoned part of the bargain in the liability he went in for in representing to the waiter as he did? Above, I suppose, the answer is, 'No'. He made clear what message he had to offer. He need be, so is not to be, held responsible for more.

Responsibility gives a reading to that 'ought to be taken' in that step, in section 4, from the psychological to the logical, from holding to being true, the step in the 'way one *did* allorepresent things being is the way one ought to have been taken to have'. There is what Pia is reasonably held responsible for in *then* lending Sid her Porsche (at least what one should have foreseen). There is the responsibility Sid undertook, *signed on for,* in saying Pia to have ordered *oursins*. Allorepresenting is among a thinker's means for undertaking responsibility. There is then what it is *fair* to hold him to have signed on for in using those means then. How he represented things as being is fixed thereby.

Sid makes recognisable two things about his allorepresenting. First, he is to be taken as representing things being as he does *in* representing them *as* being a certain way, namely, such that Pia ordered the *oursins*. In his execution of his project, the words he used are assigned the task of making *this* recognisable. Second, he is to be taken as representing things as being that way whose instancing would have a certain bearing on the way to execute a certain further project—the perplexed waiter's. He is to be—or asks to be—assigned responsibility accordingly. Perhaps he *could not* be doing both these things jointly. Such is *one* way for it not to be possible to take him as he asks to be. Perhaps one *cannot* understand ordered *oursins* so that whether Pia spoke does not bear on this, or that whether she did *thus* bears on what the waiter is to do. But suppose we can. Sid ought not to be held to be taking on responsibility he makes *recognisable* that he is not signing on for. One ought not so to rely on him. In which case, these two features of what Sid was to be taken to be doing jointly identify what it would be for things to be that created way, being as he thus represented things. It is that way which reaches to just those cases in which the world is such as to bear as it was to be supposed to bear on what the waiter was to do, where things so being is understandable (*might* count) as Pia having ordered *oursins*. It matters not whether it has another name.

Sid represents things as he does *in* speaking of them as a certain way there is anyway for things to be: such that Pia ordered *oursins*. He speaks on a particular understanding of her having done so. *One* way to picture this would be as filling-in. That way he spoke of, Pia having ordered *oursins*, reaches as such in a certain way. Some range of cases is thus reached. Some other range fails to be. Other cases remain undetermined. What it *is* for Pia to have ordered *oursins* yields as such no verdict where Sid alone spoke to the waiter. The particular understanding on which Sid spoke fills in some undetermined cases: on it some of these are reached, some fail to be reach, by that way he spoke of.

If this is how things are, one might get a further idea. If Sid's work of representing fills in understanding of that way he speaks of, so that *his* representing things as that way reaches differently than that way on its own, then, perhaps, on some occasion his representing simply fails to accomplish any such work. Then things being as he represented them would reach exactly as things being such that Pia ordered *oursins* does on its own. Perhaps an unthinking allorepresenter could represent like that. What Sid thus did contingently would just be, necessarily, its lot.

In what sort of case would Sid have done no such work? One might think: when Sid spoke to the waiter, his talk of Pia ordering had an agenda. Our talk often has much less of one. Suppose Sid simply wrote a postcard to Ed back home: 'Wonderful dinner last night. I ordered *bulots*, Pia ordered *oursins*.' Not much there by way of further purpose to be served. But now, must Pia have done the talking for things to be as Sid wrote? Nothing in his writing this gives one any reason to suppose so. So if she did, things are as Sid said. If Sid spoke for

her, they are too. But this *is* a special understanding of Pia having ordered *oursins*. What it is for her to have done so does not, on its own, *decide* whether she needed to do the talking. What it would be for her to have ordered can be understood in either way. A case where no filling in was done would be a rather special one. Perhaps we get closer to it in those rarefied situations where, as philosophers or semanticists, we ask what one *would* call ordering *oursins*, what not—projects of classifying cases (though we seldom get far with them). To direct one's 'Pia ordered *oursins*' so as for it to be understood as contributing to such a project would not be to represent aimlessly, but, on the contrary, to bend one's representing in a very special way to the service of further aims and projects. If such can be done, it is surely available only to one who, by the same token, has a capacity for filling in.

Sid's filling in as he does is the exercise of a capacity. Such is a capacity to direct (orchestrate) his representing so as to achieve representing in some one way rather than another—to fill in in one way rather than another, if such is to be the image. He can direct so as to select. For this he must be sensitive to what there is to aim at—to what would be achieved in directing things in some one way as opposed to others. Thus that he can assume responsibility, be held to account. Still retaining the image, he must also be sensitive to the possibilities for filling in—to when one *can* understand ordering *oursins* in various ways, and *how* one can. For one so equipped, achieving *no* filling in is just directing one's representing in one way rather than others he might. It is just one case among others, the null case, drawing on the same capacities—the null case, a degenerate case if you like.

Sid represents as he does *in* representing things as a certain uncreated way. Sensitivity to the possibilities for filling in the reach of that way is just sensitivity to how that way reaches, an ability to acknowledge *it* for what it is. Such belongs to a capacity to represent things as that way *punkt*, independent of how one represents things in doing so. Even if Sid deployed a vehicle which, as such, speaks of being that way (in the only aspect in which a vehicle could), still, it is not automatic that every use of that vehicle in representing (or attempting to) is a case of representing things as that way. (Recall Pia and *ortalans*.) Sid has a capacity to direct his representing so as to deploy that vehicle for deploying, in representing, that which it speaks of. It is thus that he can be credited correctly with representing *in* representing things *as* that way which is the very one of which that vehicle speaks (even, sometimes, when he does not so aim).

The unthinking representer supposed above is *saddled* with its representing. It represents blindly. It is not sensitive for possibilities for filling in a way it represents things being. For, unlike Sid, it is not equipped to acknowledge any way for things to be as the way it is—what an ability to fill in. As we saw (section 3), such equipment is proprietary to Cartesian thinkers. If *it* could represent things as that way some vehicle it produces represents them, that would not be just one special case among others of the ways open to it to direct its representing. At which point the comparison between Sid and this hypothesised unthinker collapses. The unthinker brings nothing to representing, or nothing which has yet emerged, to make its use of any vehicle representing things as being any way, no matter what the vehicle may do as such.

7. Force: Those ways *we* can represent things as being—so those ways we can take things to have been thus represented (whether by us, or by *any* representer)—are such that where we repesent things as some such way, it might be any of many things to be as thereby represented.

The last section concerned the capacities drawn on in such representing. Its idea can also be put in terms of force. For Sid to have represented Pia as having ordered the *oursins* in the way he did is for him to have assigned that way for things to be a certain status: as to be *counted* as among the ways things are where its being instanced is understood as it would be for certain purposes. Assigning status cannot be just more representing-as. This, too, would await a status. To coin a term, it is doing one's representing-as with *force*—here, in assuming responsibility, vouching for the status thus assigned.

As force is usually conceived it comes in a small range of varieties: assertive, interrogative, imperative, optative and so on. Things change if, as per above, *in* representing things as some given uncreated way there is for things to be, *one* can represent them as any of indefinitely many different ways. Throughout one would present that way *in* which he so represented things with a certain force. But it would need to be a different force in each case. He would assign *that* way for things to be a status *in re* being among the ways things are. But that status would be, not being a way things are *full stop*, but *counting* as a way things are when you understand things so being in a particular way (in the last section's image, with a particular permissible filling-in).

There is thus a selection task for force paralleling that for what way things were represented being. How Sid represented things being *in* saying Pia to have ordered *oursins* is fixed, not just by this being the way he spoke of, but also by with what force this was presented—*how* it was presented as counting as a way things are. An unthinker is as little equipped to effect the task for force on its own account as it is the selection task for ways for things to be.

An unthinker would be *overcome* by allorepresenting, as a Tourette's victim is overcome with blurtings. The expletives are not the sufferer's. The allorepresenting, one might well think, would no more be the unthinker's. Is there some default force such unthinking representing might have? Perhaps it is a 'purely generic' assertive (or imperative, or optative) force. 'Purely generic' here would be abstracting from all particularities of ways of presenting that way for things to be in which the unthinker represented things as it did. The status assigned would be: *a way things are no matter* how *you understand things so being*. The usual way of thinking of such abstraction is in terms of universal quantification: the way things are on *all* understandings of things being it.

The idea here is familiar in philosophy (cf. Clarke 1972). To paraphrase Clarke, to see whether Pia *really* ordered the *oursins*, we stand back from any mundane, local concerns such as how to tell the waiter what to do, and, purely considering the concept *ordering oursins* as such, and the world as such, ask whether Pia's doings do, or do not, fall under that concept. Whehter there *is* such a project of pure inquiry is controversial. As indicated in the last section, *if* there is, it would not be one reached by *abstracting* from all the particular varieties of assertive force we have now seen there to be (all the ways of counting a way for things to be as a way things are). It would just be another particular way of so counting things; one to be applied where very special ends were to be served. And, as we saw in section 3, classifying things according to the reach of some way for things as such anyway draws on the full resources of a Cartesian thinker. So such abstraction, if possible at all, does not relieve the unthinker of a burden. Nor is it one the unthinker would have the capacity to discharge.

Perhaps, then, the task of force-selection is performed *for* him/it. We already saw one idea for this: deference to vehicles. We saw already that *that* idea cannot work. So perhaps the

work is done by whatever *thrusts* allorepresenting on our unthinker in saddling him/it with (producing or being) some vehicle. Putting things in terms of force, though, brings out a point of Frege's. It is that no *vehicle* as such can impose a force on any representing (a version of the point above that what gives force to representing-as cannot be just more representing-as). To put the point one way, any way for an instance of 'Pia ordered *oursins*' to fail to be an assertion is a way for 'It's true that Pia ordered *oursins*' to fail to be one. When assertive force is absent, 'It's true' will not restore it, nor will 'I assert that', nor any other form of words. *Mutatis mutandis* for any other force. In another version Frege tells us that there is no assertive force "when the required seriousness is missing". Serious is not conferred by a vehicle. What is in question is the seriousness with which it is produced. A thing cannot produce the necessary seriousness by having representing *thrust* on it. It is the (would-be) *representer* who (which) must be serious. This, as we have seen, the unthinker *cannot* be on its own. This idea of abstraction, and of resulting generic forces, thus leads nowhere.

Might the unthinker then, perhaps, represent things *as* ways they are or not (though not itself thereby representing truly or falsely), while doing so with *no* force? When might a vehicle be produced forcelessly? A rhythm poet, or dadaist, might produce English sentences simply for their sound—the sentence 'Red balls roll', say, simply for the way it rolls off the tongue. Or a graffiti artist might spray such a sentence on garage doors for its elegant shape. Most red balls probably do roll, if not made of glue. The poet has not thus got things right. If his interest in sound is pure enough, then while he wrote a sentence which speaks of a way for things to be, he did not thereby engage in any representing-as at all. And if, as we stare at the garage door admiringly, a red ball rolls by, well, what a coincidence! But it is *just* a coincidence. As *some* philosophers have it, in (a) perceptual experience the world is represented to us as a certain way. If we see a pig under an oak, say, then perhaps as such that a pig is beneath an oak. But if this representing is conceived as forceless, then it might equally well represent things as any other way, say, as such that cool waters run deep, or Pia drives a Porsche. Experience's so representing things may *mean* (factively), effect-represent, or indicate, or make likely, that a pig is beneath an oak. But if the representing here is forceless, then it is not through its content that such meaning is effected. It is not as if a reason thus created for thinking a pig beneath an oak might be that experience, or this representing in it, might be *right*. Whether it is right or wrong *cannot* matter here: without force there is no way for it to be either. Representing-as thus cancels out. Representing Porsches as fast would do as well as representing a pig as beneath an oak for nature's signal that a pig is beneath an oak. For what meant in this sense of meaning to represent things *as* the way it means they are would just be a curious accident. Force is part and parcel of the step by which we move from the psychological to the logical, from mere effect-representing, or its relatives, to that *three-place* relation, representing-as.

8. Finding and Presenting: There is finding instancings, or *the* instancings, of some given way for things to be; and there is presenting things *as* some given such way. The one thing is not the other. But some might hope for the second to emerge out of the first. This section explores that idea.

An unthinker lacks capacities which, so far, appear essential for allorepresenting; *any* capacity which might permit that leap from the psychological (or its counterparts) to the logical, from holding forth, or holding messages to being true, which allorepresenting is *per se*.

How, then, might unthinking representing-as ever be thought a possibility? One prominent idea is that allorepresenting might emerge out of (the maintaining of) patterns of effect-representing, aided, perhaps, by the point of maintaining them. The allorepresenting would be by, or in, that in which such patterns were maintained. This section explores that idea.

The simplest patterns are generalisations, the simplest generalisations universal. Those empty seats in the theatre (or their presence) effect-represent casting Sid in the lead role. Empty seats in a theatre might always do that, if Sid got around enough. Or, to complicate things, they might usually, or normally, or (other modifier) do so. So far, it is the presence of those empty seats which does the representing. If allorepresenting emerged here, what would do it? Frege writes,

> No one can be prohibited from adopting any arbitrarily occurring event
> or object as a sign for whatever. (1892: 26)

Empty seats *could* be appropriated as a sign that Sid plays the lead. They would thus be a *vehicle* of representing-as. What would do the appropriating in the allorepresenting that emerged here? Whose vehicle would it be? It is sometimes thought that the question needs no answer; vehicles can get on on their own. We have seen reasons to think that idea leads nowhere. Bracket them for the nonce.

Such simple patterns are no improvement on the individual case. They put nothing in play not already there. Two problems. First, if we read nature's messages well enough—if we know what empty seats would mean (effect-represent), then their sight gives us good reason to suppose that Sid is in the lead. If allorepresenting emerged from their effect-representing, then, recognising this last, we might also recognise that allorepresenting for what it was. It, too, might give us reason to suppose that Sid is in the lead. But no different, or other, reason than we had simply in recognising the effect-representing; that we would have had if blind to the allorepresenting thus emerging. *This* allorepresenting of Sid as in the lead is no better reason to take him to be in it than that given by the effect-representing from which it emerged. Whereas allorepresenting is the sort of thing, by nature, for giving reason of a new and distinctive sort. If Sid tells Pia that her Porsche needs a new compressor, there are things one might recognise his performance to effect-represent without yet recognising what allorepresenting thus occurred, or that any did—e.g., successful speech therapy. That Pia's Porsche needs a new compressor is not one of these. If nature *does* hold such a message in Sid's performance, we would have to be *much* better at reading nature's messages to get this one than we need to be to recognise Sid's allorepresenting for what it was. But if do now recognise it for what it was, we *may* gain a reason we would *not* have anyway for supposing Pia's Porsche to need a new compressor. We need only recognise Sid as engaged in a project of saying how things *are*, and as executing it responsibly, knowing what he is doing. *We* need not ourselves know how to execute his project—be able to tell, without him, when saying Pia's Porsche to need a new compressor would be saying how things are.

(A related point. Where there *is* allorepresenting, what it *is* and what *it* effect-represents are absolutely independent. Sid's telling Pia that her Porsche needs a new compressor may effect-represent a checkered (or checker flagged) past, or a bad hangover—and it may do this regularly, or normally, or usually—without his thereby allorepresenting things as these ways.)

The second problem in brief. In effect-representing Sid in the lead role, those empty seats represented a certain instancing of a certain way for things to be: such that Sid was in the lead. If they did that, they *ipso facto* effect-represented the instancings of countless other ways for things to be—countless co-denizens of clouds within the conceptual that *Sid being in the lead* inhabits. Such would remain so if empty seats *always* effect-represented Sid in the lead—wherever, that is, nature is so arranged. Effect-representing does not perform the selection task. Nor would generalisations of the kind just scouted.

But if allorepresenting has not yet emerged, perhaps we are looking at too simple patterns. Here is another idea. Sometimes we can say: A effect-represents (or *would* effect-represent) B *if all is/were going right*. That needle on the gauge effect-represents the tank's being half full if all is going right. Those hands on the dial (or their present position) effect-represents its being 10 o'clock local time if all is going right (if Sid remembered to reset his watch). Such patterns, if any, are those from which someone *might* think allorepresenting could emerge. I will expand that idea.

There are designs which, if realised, would make for A effect-representing B. A device, or mechanism, or system, or (perhaps) phenomenon may realise such a design. Man, or nature, may provide such devices (or etc.). (Examples above.) Sometimes by this design, sometimes, perhaps not, the device produces, on occasion, a certain outcome (or type of outcome), A. The output may be a product—a signal, say, or an effect—or it may be the device's going into a certain state, A (or of type A). When such a device is working as per design (as *any* device is liable, on occasion, not to do), A, as thus produced, effect-represents B (what it was designed to). A would occur *only* if there were B to thank. Such a device may be *for* realising this design in this sense: but for some need thus to connect A and B, the device would not have been created. I will call such a device a B-detector: where the device produces A as outcome, you can bet on B's occurrence (*if* all went as per design). Bs are historical occurrences, e.g., of porcine presence. What the device detects is thus particular *instancings* of things being a certain way, e.g., such that a pig is present.

Depending on what it was detecting, a detector might need to exploit compositionality. If, say, it were detecting where animate things were, it would need indefinitely many dedicated outcomes for each of indefinitely many arrays of locations relative to it at which there might be such things for it to detect. Composing outcomes would be called for. For present purpose such changes nothing.

A design might also be for (as I will speak) *locating* (cases of) B: not just for making it so that A would effect-represent B, but also for making it so that, all working as per design, B, if suitably occurring would be effect-represented by A. So if B is (suitably) occurring, you can bet on A, again all going as per design. Now the hope is, either for detectors, or for locators, that, in detecting, or locating, as the case may be, they will also be representing things as being that way whose instances are thus detected or located.

On one notion of *device*, a device for detecting (or locating) would work in the first instance by responsiveness to *proximal* provocation. It would effect-represent such provocation. If allorepresenting were to emerge from its workings, one might see it as simply representing things as being such that there is such provocation—in this sense simply representing the proximal. But in most cases of interest, the device will be for detecting, or locating, the distal, e.g., porcine presence. When it works as per design, it will effect-represent those distal things too. And the hope will be that those ways for things to be whose

instancings it detects or locates will be the ways it allorepresents things being. What is thus responsive to the distal *in* its responsiveness to the proximal is inherently subject to what would be for it ringers: there might be the right proximal provocation without the wanted distal happenings, and vice-versa.

Our samples, so far, are manmade. But such devices can be natural. Pigs chew straw, it is said in some parts, when it is about to rain. In perceiving, it is sometimes said, we experience the world being represented (to us) as being thus and so. What of this case? Pia sees the pig before her. Her doing so is thanks, *inter alia*, to there being one. So it effect-represents there being one. *Thus* far all is in place for her to be a pig detector, her seeing a pig being the outcome which would be detection. But it takes no *design* to realise this connection, *a fortiori* not one which works *via* responsiveness to the proximal. There is no such thing as her seeing a pig failing to effect-represent presence of that pig. So, though I have tried to remain ecumenical on the crucial point here (not to anticipate routes by which *someone* might see representing-as as emerging), Pia's case to be a detector by virtue of her capacity to *see* pigs sits ill with our present notion of a detector—one designed to fit the intuition that *nature* might make representing-as emerge.

Design comes into the picture here when it comes to *locating* cases of porcine presence. What needs explaining is not that when Pia sees a pig there is a pig, but rather that she does such a thing at all. Indeed, Pia (if adequately sighted) is such that, by design, when a pig is before her (and she is looking), all going well, she will see it. Such is no thanks to *her* responses to proximal provocation (though it may depend on some processor's responses). Nor, correlatively, is *this* capacity exposed to ringers: the indicated outcome with no pig before her. Nor to a ringer for *no* pig (hence a pig) which she experiences visually without thereby seeing a pig.

If Pia sees a pig, then, though this does effect-represent porcine presence, such does not bear on the reason she thus gains for taking there to be a pig before her. Her reason gained is not given by the fact of her seeing a pig, but rather by what she sees—a pig before her—which she can recognise as a case of a pig being before her (as being such that a pig *is* before her). As Frege notes, such recognition is a function of thought, not vision. What is gained is reason so to suppose—nothing short of *proof* that there is a pig—which need not consist in *reasons* so to suppose. Such reason gained, considerations of effect-representing could add nothing, could not so much as *be* reason so to suppose. If representing-as emerged from this effect-representing, it would offer *exactly* that much.

Things would be different if for Pia to see the pig is for her to be in, not just that state, but some other visual state—one, say, of being appeared to *thus*—which she could conceivably be in even were there no pig. Then it needs explaining how *this* state in fact effect-represents a pig before her (when it does). A design is called for; one whose realising would maintain the right relation (all going well). A design for given proximal responsiveness seems indicated. With *this* state as the indicated outcome Pia fits the model of a pig detector. If allorepresenting ever does emerge out of effect-representing conditions might now be ripe for this. Such allorepresenting might even have a point. It might give Pia reason to suppose of what *this* state is visual awareness of that *this* time it effect-represents what it ought, porcine presence (though it is hard to see how this could ever be good reason). Reason the more, I suggest, to find this a bad picture of perception. For present purposes, though, I simply mark this as the picture in which the idea of representing-as in perceptual experience *might* look promising.

Back to the general question how representing-as might emerge. What I now want to stress is the distance by which detecting instancings of some way for things to be, or locating *its* instancings, falls short of presenting things as being that way, or placing things under given generalities—as one does in representing-as. Such will bear particularly on the second problem above. A good way into the matter is the following. A detector (or locator) works according to a particular design; a design for detecting whatever it is that it detects. It works via the proximal, and it works in a particular way. A pig detector, e.g., may be sensitive in its outcomes to a pig's distinctive snout: whether it produces that outcome which is to effect-represent porcine presence depends on whether it has detected (or done what, for it, ought to be detecting) such a snout. And it detects such snouts by marks of such which, by design, would be proximally accessible to it, once again, all going well. But by what marks, or means, such things as pigs or Porsches, yellow or snores, *are* detectable depends on the environment. Equally for anything else liable to be *detectably* present or not in the sublunary world we inhabit. So a condition for a detector, or locator, so much as *being* that is that it work in an environment hospitable to its ways. This point entered the picture already, as we saw, with the very idea of proximality.

You *can* tell a pig by its snout. You can rely on this given how things are. But no one supposes that to be a pig just *is* to have such a snout. Plastic surgery alone rules that out. To be a pig is not just, and not *per se*, to *look* some particular way. So in the wrong environment (e.g., too much cosmetic surgery), a pig-detector which worked by means of snouts simply would not be a *pig* detector. *We* can recognise when it would not be. We can look at its workings, on the one hand, and, on the other, at the reasons for and against counting what *it* would be identifyng as pigs (if detecting at all) as *pigs*. We can exercise our capacities for retrospection, capacities to be abashed. An unthinking detector has no such capacities, *cannot* be abashed.

The unthinking detector lacks a capacity we have: sensitivity, case by case, to what bears, or might, and how it might, on whether *that* case is to be counted as one of instancing any given generality—notably, here, that generality whose instancings are to be detected. As noted long ago, such capacities are reserved for Cartesian thinkers. An unthinking detector thus could not be sensitive to what distinguishes *this* way for things to be, such that there is a pig beneath the oak, from countless others, notably, others inhabiting clouds around it. This does not matter to detection, but certainly does to presenting. For presenting things as being such-and-such way, a selection task must be achieved. That way things are presented *as* being must be distinguished, in the presentation, from its fellows within conceptual, notably those overlapping with it through some proper part of the space of particular cases, but diverging from it in other proper parts. Such selecting is beyond the powers of an unthinking detector (or locator). Mere detection does not demand it. Assume the detector/locator in an hospitable environment where he/it always gets things right. If it is representing things as some way it is detecting in this environment, such fixes *something* as to how that way reaches. It reaches to *these* cases. But such is only a proper part of its reach. The unthinking detector/locator has *no* capacity to see when it would have left an hospitable environment or how, or, when it has, what detection then would be. It thus cannot do what any thinking allorepresenter can. Which robs us to our right to suppose that the notion *environment hospitable to its detecting* has a determinate sense or application, that it is so much as fixed what an hospitable environment for *it* would be.

A detector might fail either through migration into hostile territory, or thanks to some

one-off ringer. *If* he/it represented things *as* those ways whose cases he/it was thus detecting, such would be cases of representing falsely. But the unthinking representer *cannot* represent itself as in an hospitable environment. It is blind to when *this* would be so. The Porsche detector which blinks each time a Porsche passes, put in the world of knockoff Porsches, can do no more than carry on. Its detection work in no way equips it to approach the question whether it is in a knockoff world. That it is not cannot be how things are according to it. Nor can it be held responsible, where ringers are about, for whether what it blinks to is a *Porsche*. Such thus cannot really be, in such circumstances, how it represents things being. If it represented-as at all, it might just as well be that those instancings to which it continues blinking are just those of the way it represents things being.

Detection buys the unthinker no standing in the realm of allorepresenters, since it does not equip him/it to effect selection. With which the idea of allorepresenting emerging out of detecting, or locating, collapses. What qualifies an unthinker as a detector is not what *could* qualify it as a presenter, or placer, so as allorepresenting-as (as presenting something *as* falling under some generality). Allorepresenting cannot *thus* emerge.

9. Collapse: A pattern which made for detecting (or locating) instancings of some bit of the conceptual would not thereby make for *presenting* anything as falling under any generality. If representing-as emerged from it, so far that representing might as well be anything. Suppose we decided, though, that such representing must represent things *as* some way whose instancings are being detected. We might then try to say: it must represent things as *that* way whose instancings are being detected (or located). If it detects yellow things, the idea is, then it represents things *as* such that there is something yellow. But that move is illegitimate. The detector *detects* in its actual environment, one hospitable to such detection. By our decision it thus identifies a *proper* subpart of the reach of the way it represents things being. Nothing it does as a detector extrapolates from this sub-reach to the whole reach of that way it represents things. Otherwise put, nothing in the pattern it incorporates determines when it would have moved into a world of ringers (or what a *ringer* for what it was detecting might be). *Thus* is the move just tried on illegitimate.

In its actual environment the detector detects/locates yellow Porsches. It is endowed by design with its distinctive outcome for suitable encounters with them. Now it enters a world full of yellow silicon dummy Porsches. There is something yellow Porsches and such dummies both are. I will call it *being a siliporsh*. In its actual home, it detects and locates yellow Porsches, and it detects and locates yellow siliporshes. In its new home it detects and locates siliporshes, and detects, but no longer locates yellow Porsches. For it, the dummies are ringers for Porsches. Which of the ways whose instancings it was detecting all along (if either) would be the way it represented things *as* being (if it were to do this at all)? If it is to represent things as a way whose instancings it detects, *has* it now encountered ringers for the *relevant* such way? Nothing in its design, or in the patterns whose incorporation this maintains, decides this. Patterns of effect-representing thus cannot perform the selection task for it.

Back to the actual. Our detector produces its assigned outcome on encounter with Pia's yellow Porsche this morning. It produces this outcome again for her Porsche this afternoon. But has it encountered a ringer *this* time? All those cases as an object's being as it was which occurred up to noon today form a subregion of the space of all particular cases. Pia's Porsche being as it will be this afternoon lies outside that subregion. Three classes of ways for things to

be trace that same path through the subregion: ones which go on to reach to her Porsche being as it will be this afternoon (being a yellow Porsche among these); those which fail to reach; and those which determine no outcome for this novel case. If you wanted to detect instancings of some way in the second or third class, you might well rely on a detector of the present kind. You might well be prepared to count this case as a one-off ringer, a momentarily inhospitable environment, especially if it were trouble to guard against it. Call this way *being a yellow Porsche**. Then the present device *is* a yellow Porsche* detector, on a suitable understanding of *inhospitable*. If some natural function is served by equipping *us* with yellow Porsche detectors (perhaps preservation of the species is furthered by designing females to be attracted to them), that function is served as well (up to insignificant differences, unforeseeable at time of design) by a yellow Porsche* detector. Up to noon today, the detector has been 'trained up' on cases of both being a yellow Porsche and being a yellow Porsche*, just as up to its entrance in the world of silicon dummies it had been 'trained up' on cases of both being a yellow Porsche and being a yellow siliporsh. Once again, what a detector is detecting could not tell us as what way it represented things if it went in for that at all.

So far we have been supposing that a detector which allorepresented would allorepresent things as some way whose instancings it detected. Why should we? Suppose a weather bureau detects the weather. When the temperature had dropped to 14° it would detect that. Its signal—the outcome reserved for this—might be some bulletin, 'Current temperature 14°.' But it might also just as well be 'Wu's bird's nest soup is legendary', if its first mission is to promote tourist trade and it sees this as currently best means for that. What it is to allorepresent leaves open such possibilities. In our own case *nothing* (but convention) shuts them down. It is hard to see what would shut them down in the unthinker's case. Mere blindness to the options is not selecting one.

Nor should we allow ourselves to be impressed here by the fact that *we* think, e.g., in terms of Porsches and not siliporshes, or being yellow and not being yellow*. An unthinker's selection task is not thus to be foisted off on us. There is no reason to suppose the unthinker to share *our* sense for what the thing to do, or, specifically, the way to represent things, would be. There is every reason not to. The unthinker has no such sense. Nor, as we are about to see, could any natural function be served by nature's arranging for the unthinker's representing to coincide with what *ours* would be.

Where nature incorporates a design for detection (or locating) in one of *its* creations, the purpose thus served—say, furthering procreation—is always found in our actual environment (or that at time of incorporation). Perhaps, as suggested above, it is just part of designing for interaction with an environment that one *cannot* design for immunity to ringers. In any case, nature's purposes are served as well as anything could serve them by designs which are not so immune. And so it designs. If allorepresenting emerged from such design there could not but be the problem just scouted. In one form this is what to count as a ringer, or when to count one as having occurred. *Something* whose *instancings* are detected by design is to be the way things are thus represented *as* being. A ringer would be a ringer for *that*. But nothing in the design choses any one such thing. Nor does the purpose such design might serve. That same problem is now familiar in another form. Nature designs for the *actual* environment, thus for a subpart of the reach of whatever way the instancings of which might thus be detected. For allorepresenting to emerge, a move must be made from this subpart to a whole reach. But such moves are no concern of nature's at all.

So things stand with the second of our two problems. I return now to the first. I approach it first through this question. If allorepresenting arose out of some pattern of effect-representing, with what *force* would this be done? An unthinker does no *autorepresenting* (I here bracket dogs and cats). Where there is *allorepresenting*, there is what makes it recognisable, its vehicle. Here this is to be some occurrence—some production or its product—which instantiates the pattern, is produced by a design for maintaining it. It is to be, in present terms, what is reserved by design in some detector for signalling detecting of some instancing of the way as which things are thus represented. The problem I will scout now arises from the fact that, to speak a bit loosely, all the information carried by the (supposed) representing is carried already by its vehicle.

The occurrence of this vehicle, like any occurrence, effect-represents all that to which it owes thanks. If all went well—if it was produced by design, and the environment was, even locally, hospitable (no ringers)—then this occurrence effect-represents what the design is a design to detect. On a given understanding of *going well*, *hospitable*, *ringer*, and so on, this would be the instancing of some way for things to be. So the occurrence of the vehicle is liable to give reason to think that there was such an instancing. It gives precisely as much reason to think this as there is then reason to think that all went well, surroundings were hospitable, and so on—*conclusive* reason, plain proof, where such things are not in doubt. The *vehicle* itself (properly, its occurrence then) has that much significance. There is, anyway, *this* to be recognised as to what to think and do. So much is recognisable to one blind to the fact that the vehicle is a vehicle of allorepresenting; to what allorepresenting there thus was, or to there having been *any,* so long as he recognises the vehicle as produced, as it was, by what incorporates such a design—by what would, if working well, etc., thus maintain that pattern of effect-representing which it is a design for maintaining.

Now suppose allorepresenting to have emerged in this operation of what produced the vehicle (the detector). What reason does this allorepresenting give for thinking and doing? How does *it*, or its occurrence, bear on what the thing to think, or do, would be? If it emerged from the pattern, as per above, then for it to have occurred is for it (or its vehicle) to have been produced in the maintaining, by design, of the relevant pattern—one such that, things going well, etc., its (or its vehicle's) production would effect-represent the instancing of what is thus effect-represented. It would have occurred on *just* that condition on the *vehicle's* effect-representing such instancing. To recognise it as the representing it is is to recognise it as *just* such a designed production. So its occurrence, if recognised for what it is, gives just the reason to think things the way it represents things being as the vehicle's occurrence itself gives for thinking this. And if it really thus emerges from the pattern, its mere occurrence can give no more.

Whereas it is essential to allorepresenting that *it* (or its occurrence) can bear on the thing to think (or do), give reason to think things one way or another (where they are represented to *be* F, *that* way) which there would not be anyway, without supposing it to have occurred, or which might recognisably be present without recognising it to have occured. When it comes to reason-giving, allorepresenting cannot be thus inert. If our yellow Porsche detector did what would here be (emergent) representing there as being a yellow Porsche, what it did, whether that or not, would anyway give as much reason to think there *was* a yellow Porsche as there is to think that all was then going well with it. Suppose it to be allorepresenting, and there is still just that much reason to think this. Such is not representing-as.

Pursuing our question about force is one way to see why it cannot be. For allorepresenting to have a given force is for it to be taken as aim aimed at particular successes (and for it to represent itself as a success in some of these). If the force is assertive, there is the success, representing things as they are. If it is imperative, there is the success *obligating* so-and-so. And so on. A force is fixes, and is identified by, the successes thus aimed at. All the more if forces are as multifarious as above suggested. From this perspective, one isolates the force of Sid's words to the waiter only in isolating in what ways what projects would be served if things are as he said. It is by, and according to, its force that given allorepresenting bears as it does, and not in other ways, on questions of the thing to think or do. If Sid has said, 'Pia ordered the *oursins*', and continued, 'That's what you think, isn't it?' then, though he would still have represented Pia *as* having ordered the *oursins*, his doing so would not have borne as it did on what the waiter was to do. The force of an allorepresenting is recognisable in how it bears. Where *it* (or its occurrence)may be taken to bear in one way or another on questions of the thing to think, facts of how it is to be taken may be rich enough to choose some force, from among the panoply of options, as its. For our yellow Porsche detector, its would be allorepresenting (on the present scheme) could have *no* bearing on the thing to think or do. The bearing there would be on such questions if it occurred would be just that which there would be without supposing it to have. In the facts of how its supposed representing is to be taken, then, there can be nothing to choose between one force and another. So it can have none.

If such allorepresenting can have no force, then (as we have already seen in one way) it can have no content either: there can be no such thing as the way it represents things as being. For, again, what content some allorepresenting has cannot matter independent of its force. The Porsche detector might signal Porsche detection in given words, say, 'Porsche ahead'. But that those words mean *Porsche ahead* is irrelevant to their function. The words might as well be, 'Pigs whistle.' All that matters is that those words, whatever they are, and whatever they mean, are the detector's response-by-design to the presence of a Porsche, so that if things are going well there will be a Porsche ahead. The words might happen to *speak*, in English, say, of a Porsche being ahead. But for their purpose here they might as well speak of anything else. It thus cannot be that the detector *uses* them to speak of that (to represent things *as* that way). Whatever the words are, they are merely recruited by the detector's design to stand as a synthetic addition to nature's messages. From their occurrence one may (sometimes) conclude that there is a Porsche, as from the pawings in the dust on the trail ahead one may conclude that the wild boar are in rut.

The difficulty with emergent allorepresenting has been, so far, that what is to make this representing recognisable as what it is is *identical* with that in it which gives reason for supposing things as to how things are, or are to be. Whereas allorepresenting is always a source of new and distinctive sorts of bearing on questions what to think or do. It is a source of reasons to think things that an unthinker could not give. In spelling this out a bit, I can reinforce and deepen the points just made.

Suppose that Sid tells us that a Porsche is in the drive. His doing so *might*, by any of countless routes, effect-represent the presence of a Porsche in the drive. (E.g., perhaps in his seeing Pia chatting with the countess, by the French doors leading to the garden.) It *could*, but need not, effect-represent his ability to tell a Porsche at sight. Such things may be nice if so. But they are not what makes his representing recognisable. No pattern of effect-representing makes for his representing, nor for it being recognisable. What makes for *his* representing, so

for its recognition, is independent of any patterns of effect-representing in which such performance may stand (Chomsky's point). Which makes room for Sid to achieve recognition through choosing means according to his insight into that audience (to which he belongs) for which (in the sense of section 4) he allorepresents; according to that audience's shared sense for how such means, deployed then, would be to be taken.

What makes Sid's representing recognisable is thus also independent of that which gives it the bearing it does on what to think and do, which makes it the reason it is for thinking this or that. If Sid represented a Porsche as in the drive, there would be a Porsche in the drive, provided that he was then executing a project of seeing how things *were*, knowing *how* to do so and *when* he would be. Where this condition is recognisably met, his so representing things gives conclusive reason to take a Porsche to be in the drive. More generally (in parallel with that supposed emergent representing-as by a detector) Sid's saying so gives as much reason to think so as there is reason to think the condition met. Notoriously we do not always tell the truth; nor are always able to tell whether we are doing so or not. But being serious (one's project being one of saying how things are) and knowing what one is talking about is something we, sometimes, can *manifestly* do. So, sometimes, we can recognise the reason Sid's saying so gives to take there to be a Porsche in the drive in recognising the reason there is to take him to be thus engaged. Sid's saying so then gives *us* such reason.

For Sid's representing to give the reason it *thus* does for thinking a Porsche in the drive, it need participate in no fixed, specifiable, pattern of effect-representing (a pattern maintained in Sid in some given way). Nor is it in recognising such a pattern that such reason is recognisable to us as given. We need know nothing of such things. Nor *could* such reason emerge from such participation. So nor could it be such participation which made it recognisable to us as given. Thus is the reason of a distinctive sort, a sort which, by nature, (non-auto) representing-as makes room for.

Sid *can* give us, in his representing, such reason to think things because, and only because, he has the capacity to see when a question, or at least the relevant question, has been *settled.* Such it is to know what one is talking about. An unthinker, a mere detector/locator, is, *a fortiori*, denied any such capacity. For such a capacity transcends any mere design for recognition in *just* the way that the reach of a way for things to be transcends those cases occurring in any given hospitable environment. Sid can tell a pig at sight, as most of the rest of us can. But you *cannot* always tell a pig by looking. A capacity to see when it is settled that it is a pig is a capacity to take such things into account. By the same failing, an unthinker could not separate what makes its allorepresenting recognisable from what makes it the reason-giving that it is; and (thus) could not make that reason-giving of the distinctive sort allowed for by allorepresenting in being what it is. The unthinker's representing-as would thus be idle. It could not add to the reason-giving there would be without it, just in nature's messages. But, for reasons given (above in discussing force), intrinsically idle representing-as would be no representing-as at all. In a different context Wittgenstein said,

> *Symbols that are dispensable have no meaning. Superfluous symbols signify nothing.* (Waismann 1979: 90 (italics his))

Such fits the present case exactly. In 1922, telling us that an unneeded sign is meaningless, he

offers a reverse side to the coin:

> If everything behaved just as though a sign had meaning, it *has*
> meaning. (1922: 3.328)

Perhaps those who propose unthinking allorepresenting (or representing-as) think they have found what *does* behave just like the real thing. If so, one might invoke this reverse side of the coin. But above are reasons why they have not.

Allorepresenting is a complex pattern woven into the fabric of our thinking worldly doings. For it to be what it is is for it to serve as it does execution of our projects. Unthinking allorepresenting would detach this pattern from the fabric, patching it into some simpler activity, still recognisable there, perhaps in more primitive form—still allorepresenting. But it is within that original whole fabric that it makes sense to speak of creating generalities under which for things to fall, according to what the thing to do *would* be in serving the needs thus to be served. It is precisely there that it makes sense to think of a way of issuing, or holding, messages which relates the issuer/bearer to a term, such as the third term in the relation *allorepresented,* which, belonging to the conceptual, does not *interact* with an environment.

Frege notes that thoughts (so ways for things to be)

> are not thoroughly without effects, but their effectiveness is of a wholly
> other sort than that of things. … their effects are triggered by the doings
> of thinkers … . (cf. 1918: 77)

Instantiating, thinkers' doings are what it takes to place thoughts in allorepresenting. Instantiating again, perceptual experience is nothing like being represented to.

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15/09/2011

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